The Second Japanese Invasion of Korea (1597-1598): The Final Campaign

Introduction: Hideyoshi’s Fury

1596. Fushimi Castle, Japan.

Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 60 years old and in declining health, sat before Ming Chinese envoys. They had come to officially “invest” him as “King of Japan”—a title within the Ming tributary system.

To the Ming court, this was a diplomatic victory: Japan acknowledging Chinese suzerainty.

To Hideyoshi, it was an insult beyond imagination.

When his interpreters explained what the ceremony actually meant—that China viewed him as a subordinate, not an equal—Hideyoshi erupted. The “negotiations” of the past four years had been a deception. China had never agreed to his terms. Ming officials had strung him along, hoping he would abandon his ambitions.

Hideyoshi’s response:

He expelled the Ming envoys, declared the treaty void, and immediately ordered preparations for a second invasion of Korea.

This time, there would be no pretense of “passage to China.” This would be punishment—a demonstration of Japanese military might. If Hideyoshi couldn’t conquer China, he would at least humiliate it by conquering its most loyal tributary.

The Second Japanese Invasion (1597-1598) would be:

More brutal than the first (targeting civilians deliberately)
More costly (both sides suffered higher casualties)
More desperate (both sides fought with fury born of exhaustion)
Ultimately futile (ended with Hideyoshi’s death and complete Japanese withdrawal)

This is the story of Japan’s final campaign in Korea—a war that achieved nothing, cost tens of thousands of lives, and ended exactly where it began.

Contents

Why a Second Invasion? The 1596 Investiture Crisis
Prelude to Disaster: The Fall of Admiral Yi (1597)
The Second Invasion Begins (January 1597)
The Battle of Chilcheonryang: Naval Catastrophe (July 15-16, 1597)
Yi Sun-sin’s Return: “I Still Have Twelve Ships”
The Battle of Myeongnyang: Thirteen vs. One Hundred Thirty-Three (October 26, 1597)
The Fortress Campaign: Brutal Sieges (1597-1598)
Siege of Ulsan (December 1597 – January 1598)
Other Major Sieges and Battles (1597-1598)
The End of the War: Withdrawal and Reckoning
Comparison: First vs. Second Invasion
The Human Cost: Casualties and Atrocities
Consequences of the Second Invasion
Lessons from the Second Invasion
Common Myths and Misconceptions
Frequently Asked Questions
Conclusion: Japan’s Futile Final Campaign
Next Steps: Explore the Aftermath
Related Articles
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Sources

Why a Second Invasion? The 1596 Investiture Crisis

The Failed Peace (1593-1597)

After the First Invasion ended in stalemate (1593), Japan and Ming China negotiated for four years.

What Hideyoshi Wanted:

Ming Emperor acknowledge Hideyoshi as equal
Cede Korean territory to Japan
Resume unrestricted trade
Ming princess marry a Japanese prince
Japan keep military presence in southern Korea

What Ming Offered:

Recognize Hideyoshi as “King of Japan” (tributary title—subordinate status)
Resume limited trade
Nothing else

The Deception:

Ming negotiators deliberately misled Hideyoshi:

Told him China had “agreed” to his terms (they hadn’t)
Sent envoys to perform investiture ceremony
Hoped Hideyoshi would accept subordinate status once presented publicly

It backfired spectacularly.

The 1596 Investiture Ceremony: The Breaking Point

The Ceremony:

In 1596, Ming envoys arrived at Fushimi Castle with:

An official seal inscribed “King of Japan” (implying vassalage to Ming)
Imperial edict addressing Hideyoshi as a subject of the Ming Emperor
Ceremonial robes (tributary king attire)

The Moment of Truth:

When Hideyoshi’s translators explained the documents’ true meaning, Hideyoshi:

Realized he’d been deceived
Flew into a rage (reportedly threw the seal and robes at the envoys)
Expelled the envoys immediately
Ordered preparation for war

Contemporary Account (from Japanese sources):

“The Taikō [Hideyoshi] fell into a great fury, saying: ‘How dare they treat me as a vassal! I shall show them the might of Japan!’”

Hideyoshi’s Decision:

Within weeks, Hideyoshi ordered:

Mobilization of 141,000 troops for a second invasion
Construction of new warships
Stockpiling of supplies
Generals to prepare for a spring 1597 landing

What Made This Invasion Different?

Strategic Differences:

First Invasion (1592):

Goal: Conquer Korea, use it as a highway to China
Strategy: Rapid advance north, capture Seoul and Pyongyang
Attitude: Conquest and occupation

Second Invasion (1597):

Goal: Punish Korea and China, demonstrate Japanese power
Strategy: Consolidate southern Korea, destroy Korean resistance, provoke Ming into costly battles
Attitude: Destruction and revenge

Hideyoshi’s Instructions to Commanders:

Unlike the First Invasion, Hideyoshi explicitly ordered:

No mercy for captured soldiers
Systematic destruction of Korean infrastructure
Mass killings to terrorize the population
Take ears and noses as trophies (proof of kills)

This invasion would be far more brutal.

Prelude to Disaster: The Fall of Admiral Yi (1597)

The Plot Against Yi Sun-sin

Before Japan’s second invasion began, Korea made a catastrophic mistake: removing Admiral Yi Sun-sin from command.

The Yoshira Conspiracy (February 1597):

Setup:

Japanese spy named Yoshira (요시라) was captured by Korean forces
Under interrogation, Yoshira “revealed” that Japanese general Katō Kiyomasa would attack a specific location on a specific date with his fleet

The Order:

Korean court officials ordered Admiral Yi to intercept Katō’s fleet.

Yi’s Refusal:

Yi refused the order. Why?

Intelligence was suspicious — Katō was a land general, not a naval commander
Obvious trap — Too specific, too convenient
Strategic risk — Moving his fleet would leave Korean waters undefended
Tactical nonsense — The proposed interception point was in dangerous waters

Yi wrote to the court: “This intelligence is false. It is a trap. I will not move my fleet.”

He was right—it was a Japanese deception designed to lure Yi into an ambush.

Yi’s Arrest, Torture, and Demotion

King Seonjo’s Fury:

King Seonjo and court officials interpreted Yi’s refusal as insubordination.

April 1597:

Yi was:

Arrested and brought to Seoul in chains
Tortured to extract a confession of treason
Sentenced to death by beheading

Only intervention by high officials (including Ryu Seong-ryong, the Prime Minister) saved Yi’s life.

Instead of execution:

Yi was stripped of all rank
Demoted to common soldier
Sent to serve in the army under General Gwon Yul

Yi’s Replacement: Won Gyun

Won Gyun (원균) was appointed as the new naval commander.

Won Gyun’s Background:

Jealous rival of Yi Sun-sin for years
Politically connected but militarily incompetent
Arrogant and reckless
Ignored advice from experienced officers

Foreshadowing disaster.

The Second Invasion Begins (January 1597)

Japanese Landing: January-February 1597

Invasion Force:

Total Strength: ~141,000 troops (smaller than the first invasion’s 158,800)

Divided into Multiple Armies:

Eastern Army (Katō Kiyomasa, Kuroda Nagamasa) — ~40,000 troops
Western Army (Konishi Yukinaga, Mōri forces) — ~30,000 troops
Southern Army (Shimazu, Tachibana) — ~25,000 troops
Reserve and Support — ~46,000 troops

Landing Zones:

Unlike the first invasion (concentrated at Busan), the second invasion featured multiple simultaneous landings:

Busan (primary landing)
Seonsan
Ulsan
Sacheon
Multiple southern ports

Japanese Strategy:

This time, Japan did not attempt to race to Seoul. Instead:

Secure southern Korea (establish fortified positions)
Build Japanese-style fortresses (earthen fortifications called wajō, 倭城)
Hold defensive positions and bleed Korean-Ming forces in sieges
Provoke Ming into costly battles

Japan was playing the long game—occupation, not conquest.

Korean Defense Preparation

Land Forces:

Korea had learned from the first invasion:

Rebuilt army with better training
Fortified key positions (coastal fortresses strengthened)
Organized Righteous Armies (civilian militias) more effectively
Coordinated with Ming forces (joint command structure)

Naval Forces—Until Won Gyun Destroyed Them:

Yi Sun-sin had left a powerful fleet:

~150-200 warships
Trained crews
Established tactics and intelligence networks

All of this would be destroyed in a single day.

The Battle of Chilcheonryang: Naval Catastrophe (July 15-16, 1597)

Won Gyun’s Incompetence

Won Gyun’s Tenure (April-July 1597):

After taking command, Won Gyun:

Ignored intelligence from scouts and spies
Disregarded advice from experienced officers (Yi’s trained captains)
Made reckless decisions driven by desire for glory
Neglected logistics and ship maintenance

Officers’ Warnings:

Multiple naval officers warned Won Gyun that Japanese forces were preparing a trap at Chilcheonryang (칠천량, Seven Straits).

Won Gyun’s response: “You are cowards. I will crush the Japanese and show I am greater than Yi Sun-sin.”

The Trap at Chilcheonryang (July 15-16, 1597)

Date: July 15-16, 1597
Location: Chilcheonryang, narrow straits near Geoje Island

Korean Fleet:

Commander: Won Gyun
Strength: ~150-170 warships
Composition: Mix of panokseon and smaller vessels

Japanese Fleet:

Commander: Todo Takatora (藤堂高虎), experienced naval commander
Strength: Unknown (likely 200+ ships)
Strategy: Lure Won Gyun into narrow straits, then ambush

The Battle: A Total Disaster

July 15, Evening:

Won Gyun ordered the Korean fleet to sail toward Chilcheonryang, ignoring warnings about:

Narrow waters (poor maneuverability)
Japanese numerical advantage
Incoming tide (favoring Japanese positions)
Intelligence reports of Japanese fleet concentration

July 15, Late Evening – July 16, Dawn:

Phase 1: The Lure

Korean fleet entered the narrow straits
Saw what appeared to be a small Japanese squadron
Won Gyun ordered attack

Phase 2: The Ambush

Japanese main fleet emerged from hidden positions
Korean fleet trapped in narrow waters
Japanese ships surrounded Koreans on three sides

Phase 3: Slaughter

Japanese fireships set Korean vessels ablaze
Concentrated arquebus fire swept Korean decks
Korean ships collided in panic
Won Gyun’s command structure collapsed

The Massacre:

Korean fleet routed in complete chaos
Ships burned, sunk, or captured
Thousands of sailors killed or drowned
Won Gyun killed in the battle (accounts vary—either died fighting or committed suicide)

Result: Korea’s Naval Power Destroyed

Casualties:

Korean ships lost: ~150-170 ships (nearly the entire fleet)
Korean casualties: ~7,000-10,000 killed or drowned
Survivors: Only 12-13 ships escaped
Japanese losses: Minimal

Strategic Impact:

✗ Six years of Yi Sun-sin’s work destroyed in one day
✗ Korean naval superiority lost
✗ Japanese control of Korean waters (temporarily)
✗ Southern coast exposed to Japanese landings
✗ Supply routes compromised

Historical Assessment:

The Battle of Chilcheonryang is remembered as:

One of Korea’s worst military disasters
A direct result of political interference (removing Yi)
Proof that leadership quality determines outcomes (Yi never lost; Won Gyun lost everything)

The Korean court realized their catastrophic mistake.

Yi Sun-sin’s Return: “I Still Have Twelve Ships”

Desperate Reinstatement (August 1597)

With the navy destroyed and Japanese ships roaming freely, King Seonjo had no choice.

August 1597:

Yi Sun-sin was:

Reinstated as naval commander (three months after his demotion)
Ordered to rebuild the fleet—but also told to disband the remaining ships and retreat to land

Yi’s Response:

Yi sent a letter to King Seonjo that became one of Korea’s most famous historical quotes:

“I still have twelve ships. I am confident that, if I choose the right opportunities, I can still prevent the enemy. While I am alive, the enemy shall not be allowed to ignore our presence.”
— Admiral Yi Sun-sin, August 1597

Translation:
“Give me twelve ships and I will hold the line. As long as I live, Japan will fear us.”

Yi’s Situation:

Surviving ships: 12-13 panokseon warships (sources differ)
Crews: Demoralized survivors of Chilcheonryang
Supplies: Minimal
Support: Limited (King still distrusted him)
Enemy: Japanese fleet of 133-333 ships (sources vary widely)

Conventional military wisdom: Disband, retreat, wait for Ming reinforcements.

Yi’s decision: Fight.

The Battle of Myeongnyang: Thirteen vs. One Hundred Thirty-Three (October 26, 1597)

The Impossible Situation

Date: October 26, 1597
Location: Myeongnyang Strait (명량해협), between Jindo Island and the mainland

Yi’s Assessment:

Yi understood:

He could not defeat 133+ ships in open water
He could use geography to negate Japanese numerical advantage
The Myeongnyang Strait was Korea’s best defensive position

Geography: Yi’s Force Multiplier

Myeongnyang Strait Characteristics:

Width: ~300 meters at the narrowest point (some sources say 200m)

Tidal Currents:

Among the strongest in the world
Reverse direction every ~3 hours
Speed: Up to 10-11 knots (over 18 km/h)
Create dangerous whirlpools and eddies

Strategic Advantage:

Narrow channel — Japanese couldn’t use numerical superiority (only a few ships could engage at once)
Tidal currents — Yi could time engagement to use currents against Japanese
Local knowledge — Yi knew the strait intimately; Japanese didn’t
Defensive position — Yi’s ships could anchor; Japanese had to navigate dangerous waters

Yi’s Plan:

Anchor at the narrowest point (blocking passage)
Engage when tidal current favored Korean positions
Focus fire on Japanese lead ships
Wait for current reversal (would sweep disabled Japanese ships back into their own fleet)

The Korean Fleet: Thirteen Ships

Forces:

13 Korean panokseon warships (some sources say 12)
Commander: Admiral Yi Sun-sin
Crews: Survivors of Chilcheonryang + newly recruited sailors
Morale: Low (many wanted to retreat)

Yi’s Leadership:

Before the battle, Yi’s officers and captains urged retreat. Japanese scouts had reported the enemy fleet’s size—133 ships (some Korean sources claim 333).

The odds: 10-to-1 (or 25-to-1).

Yi’s Response:

Yi reportedly said:

“If we retreat now, we shall die. If we advance and fight, we may also die—but the enemy will die with us. And if we choose our ground well, we may not die at all.”
— Admiral Yi Sun-sin, October 26, 1597 (paraphrased from various sources)

Yi then anchored his flagship at the narrowest point of the strait—refusing any possibility of retreat.

Message to his fleet: “We stand here. We do not run. If any ship retreats, I will personally execute the captain.”

The Japanese Fleet

Forces:

133 warships (Korean accounts; Japanese sources suggest ~300-330)
Commanders: Kurushima Michifusa (来島通総) led the vanguard; Todo Takatora commanded the main fleet
Composition: Mix of large warships and smaller craft
Confidence: High (fresh from Chilcheonryang victory)

Japanese Assessment:

Todo Takatora expected an easy victory:

Outnumbered Koreans 10-to-1 (or more)
Korean morale shattered after Chilcheonryang
Yi Sun-sin recently reinstated, fleet disorganized

Japanese Strategy:

Overwhelm with numbers
Surround and board Korean ships
Destroy Yi’s small fleet and open southern waters

The Battle: Hour by Hour

Early Morning, October 26, 1597:

Phase 1: Initial Engagement (~10:00 AM – 11:00 AM)

Japanese vanguard (20-30 ships under Kurushima Michifusa) entered the strait
Yi’s flagship held position, anchored at the chokepoint
Japanese ships advanced confidently

Yi’s Command: “Hold fire until they’re in range. Concentrated fire on the lead ships.”

11:00 AM:

Japanese lead ships came within ~600-800 meters (cannon range)
Korean ships opened fire (12-20 cannons per ship, concentrated volley)
First Japanese vessels took heavy damage
Kurushima’s ship was hit repeatedly

Japanese Response:

More ships pushed forward
Narrow strait prevented maneuvering—ships funneled into a kill zone
Korean cannons continued devastating fire

Phase 2: The Japanese Assault (~11:30 AM – 1:00 PM)

Japanese committed more ships, trying to overwhelm Korean defenses
~50-60 Japanese ships crowded into the narrow waters
Ships began colliding with each other (limited space)
Korean fire intensified

Kurushima Michifusa’s Death:

Kurushima’s flagship was hit by concentrated fire
According to Japanese accounts, Kurushima was killed by a Korean cannonball
Japanese vanguard lost its commander

Panic in Japanese Fleet:

Kurushima’s death caused confusion
Japanese ships in the strait began attempting to withdraw
More ships behind pushed forward
Traffic jam in the narrow channel

Phase 3: The Tidal Current Reverses (~1:00 PM – 2:00 PM)

The Turning Point:

The tidal current reversed direction, now flowing against the Japanese fleet.

Effect:

Damaged Japanese ships unable to control their movement
Ships swept backward into following vessels
Collisions, tangled rigging, chaos
Japanese fleet lost cohesion

Yi’s Fleet:

Korean ships, anchored or positioned strategically, maintained formation
Continued concentrated fire
Japanese ships unable to close for boarding

Phase 4: Japanese Retreat (~2:00 PM – 3:00 PM)

Japanese Assessment:

Todo Takatora (commanding the main fleet behind the vanguard) realized:

The vanguard was destroyed or disabled
The strait was a death trap
Continuing the assault would be suicidal

Japanese Decision: Retreat.

Japanese fleet withdrew from Myeongnyang Strait
Left ~31 ships sunk, burning, or disabled (Korean count)
Thousands of Japanese sailors killed or drowned

Result: One of History’s Greatest Naval Victories

Casualties:

Korean Losses:

Ships lost: 0 (zero)
Killed: 2 sailors
Wounded: 3 sailors

Japanese Losses (Korean Sources):

Ships destroyed: 31 confirmed sunk or burned (some sources claim more)
Ships damaged: Dozens more (limped away)
Casualties: ~4,000-5,000 killed or drowned (estimates)

Strategic Impact:

✅ Japanese advance halted — Could not break through to resupply routes
✅ Korean naval power restored — Yi proved the fleet was still formidable
✅ Psychological victory — Shattered Japanese confidence
✅ Bought time — Allowed Korea-Ming forces to regroup

Historical Significance

The Battle of Myeongnyang is considered one of history’s greatest naval victories based on:

Odds Overcome: 13 ships defeated 133+ ships (10-to-1 or worse)
Perfect Record: 0 ships lost (vs. 31 enemy ships destroyed)
Tactical Genius: Use of terrain, timing, and psychology
Strategic Impact: Turned the tide of the Second Invasion

Comparisons:

Battle of Thermopylae (480 BC): 300 Spartans delayed Persians—but were annihilated
Battle of Agincourt (1415): Outnumbered English won—but suffered significant casualties
Battle of Myeongnyang (1597): 13 ships defeated 133+—and lost almost no one

No naval battle in history rivals Myeongnyang’s odds and outcome.

For more details: The Battle of Myeongnyang: 13 Ships vs. 133 (coming soon)

The Fortress Campaign: Brutal Sieges (1597-1598)

Japanese Strategy Shift

After Myeongnyang, Japan realized:

Naval breakthrough impossible (Yi Sun-sin restored Korean dominance)
Rapid conquest impossible (Ming forces too strong)

New Strategy: Fortress Defense

Japan built Japanese-style fortresses (wajō, 倭城) across southern Korea:

Earthen fortifications (resistant to cannon fire)
Multiple defensive layers
Self-sufficient (gardens, wells inside)
Strategic positions (controlling roads and ports)

Major Japanese Fortresses:

Ulsan (Katō Kiyomasa)
Sacheon (Shimazu Yoshihiro)
Suncheon (Konishi Yukinaga)
Namwon (later destroyed by Japanese)

Japanese Plan:

Hold southern Korea indefinitely
Bleed Korean-Ming forces in costly sieges
Negotiate from a position of strength

Siege of Ulsan (December 1597 – January 1598)

The Fortress

Location: Ulsan, southeastern Korea
Commander: Katō Kiyomasa (加藤清正), “The Tiger of Korea”
Garrison: ~10,000 Japanese troops
Fortifications: Multi-layered earthen fortress with deep moats, multiple baileys

Japanese Preparation:

Katō built one of the strongest wajō fortresses
Stockpiled food and ammunition
Prepared for long siege

The Siege Forces

Allied Besiegers:

Ming forces: ~30,000-40,000 troops (General Yang Hao)
Korean forces: ~10,000 troops
Total: ~40,000-50,000 attackers

Odds: 4-to-1 or 5-to-1 in favor of attackers.

The Siege: December 1597 – January 1598

Phase 1: Initial Assault (Late December 1597)

Ming-Korean forces surrounded Ulsan
Attempted direct assaults on walls
Repelled with heavy casualties

Japanese Defense:

Arquebus fire from ramparts devastated attackers
Multi-layer defenses meant breaching one wall didn’t capture the fortress
Sorties disrupted siege equipment

Phase 2: Starvation Tactics (Late December – Early January)

Ming forces settled into siege
Cut off Japanese supply lines
Waited for starvation

Japanese Situation:

Food ran out quickly
Soldiers ate horses, leather, tree bark
Disease spread
Morale plummeted

Phase 3: Japanese Relief Force (Mid-January 1598)

Mōri Hidemoto led a relief force (~20,000 troops)
Attacked Ming siege lines from outside
Broke through, resupplied Ulsan

Result:

Siege failed
Ming forces withdrew after weeks of fighting
~10,000-15,000 Ming-Korean casualties
~2,000-3,000 Japanese casualties

Why Did the Siege Fail?

Fortress design — Japanese wajō earthen fortifications resisted cannon fire
Japanese determination — Soldiers preferred death to surrender
Relief force — External reinforcements broke the siege
Ming caution — After heavy losses, Ming commanders unwilling to continue costly assaults

Lesson: Even with overwhelming numbers, besieging a well-designed fortress defended by determined troops is extremely costly.

Other Major Sieges and Battles (1597-1598)

Siege of Sacheon (September-October 1598)

Fortress: Sacheon, held by Shimazu Yoshihiro
Besiegers: ~30,000 Ming-Korean forces
Result: Siege failed — Japanese held the fortress, Ming casualties ~10,000+

Battle of Noryang: The Final Battle (December 16, 1598)

By late 1598, the war was ending—not because anyone won, but because Toyotomi Hideyoshi died.

Hideyoshi’s Death (September 18, 1598):

Hideyoshi, 61 years old and suffering from illness, died at Fushimi Castle.

His final orders:

Keep his death secret until Japanese forces withdrew from Korea
Council of Five Elders to govern Japan
Evacuate all troops from Korea

Japanese Withdrawal:

By November-December 1598, Japanese forces began evacuating:

Ships assembled at southern ports
Troops retreated from fortresses
Goal: Complete withdrawal by year’s end

The Battle of Noryang (December 16, 1598)

Date: December 16, 1598 (night battle)
Location: Noryang Strait (노량해협), southern coast

Context:

Japanese forces evacuating Korea
Allied fleets intercepted the withdrawal

Allied Fleet:

Korean: ~82 ships (Admiral Yi Sun-sin)
Ming: ~130 ships (Admiral Chen Lin)
Total: ~212 allied ships

Japanese Fleet:

~500 ships (mostly transports with escorts)
Goal: Safe evacuation to Japan

The Battle: Yi’s Last Stand

Night of December 16, 1598:

Allied Strategy:

Attack at night (fire ships for illumination)
Target transport ships (prevent evacuation)
Coordinate Korean-Ming attacks

The Battle:

Allied fleet attacked Japanese convoy
Fire ships set multiple vessels ablaze
Fierce fighting through the night

Result:

~200+ Japanese ships destroyed (burned or sunk)
~10,000 Japanese casualties
Decisive allied victory

But tragedy struck.

Yi Sun-sin’s Death

The Fatal Moment:

As dawn broke and the Japanese fleet collapsed, Admiral Yi Sun-sin was struck by a stray arquebus bullet (some accounts say random cannonball fragment).

The wound: Left side, below the armpit—mortal.

Yi’s Final Command:

According to his nephew Yi Wan and son Yi Hoe (both present):

“The battle is at its height. Beat my war drums. Do not announce my death.”
— Admiral Yi Sun-sin’s last words, December 16, 1598

Yi died minutes later, at approximately 5:00 AM.

His armor was placed on his body, and his son and nephew continued issuing commands in Yi’s name until the battle concluded.

The allied fleet did not learn of Yi’s death until hours after victory.

Yi’s Final Record

23 naval battles fought. 23 naval battles won. 0 naval battles lost.

Admiral Yi Sun-sin died undefeated—the only admiral in history with such a record.

Age at death: 53 (54 in Korean age)

Legacy: Korea’s greatest military hero.

For full biography: Admiral Yi Sun-sin: Biography

The End of the War: Withdrawal and Reckoning

Complete Japanese Withdrawal (December 1598 – February 1599)

Final Evacuation:

By early 1599:

All Japanese forces withdrawn from Korea
Fortresses abandoned
No territory gained
No concessions from China or Korea

Final Japanese Casualty Count (Second Invasion):

~30,000-50,000 killed (combat + disease)
Mostly from disease, starvation, and failed sieges

Why Did the Second Invasion Fail?

Reasons for Japanese Defeat:

Hideyoshi’s Death — Removed the political will to continue
Admiral Yi Sun-sin — Restored Korean naval dominance after Myeongnyang
Fortress Stalemate — Japanese couldn’t advance; Koreans-Ming couldn’t dislodge them
Exhaustion — Six years of war drained Japanese resources
No Strategic Goal — The Second Invasion had no clear objective (revenge is not strategy)

Strategic Futility:

The Second Invasion achieved: ✗ No territorial gains
✗ No concessions from Ming China
✗ No weakening of Korea (if anything, resistance strengthened)
✗ No path to conquering China

Japan fought for two years and gained nothing.

Comparison: First vs. Second Invasion

First Invasion (1592-1593)

Strategy: Rapid conquest, advance to China
Initial Success: Captured Seoul in 20 days
Turning Point: Admiral Yi’s naval victories + Ming intervention
Outcome: Stalemate, negotiations

Characteristics:

Lightning advances
Emphasis on conquest
Some restraint toward civilians (initially)

Second Invasion (1597-1598)

Strategy: Consolidate southern Korea, fight defensive war
Initial Success: Destroyed Korean fleet at Chilcheonryang
Turning Point: Admiral Yi’s return, Battle of Myeongnyang
Outcome: Hideyoshi’s death → withdrawal

Characteristics:

Fortress-based defense
Emphasis on attrition
Deliberate brutality toward civilians

Which Invasion Was More Destructive?

Second Invasion was more brutal:

Higher civilian casualties (deliberate targeting)
More systematic destruction (scorched earth)
Ear and nose mutilation (trophies of kills)
Psychological warfare (terrorizing population)

First Invasion caused more territorial disruption (occupied more of Korea).

Second Invasion caused more human suffering (more deliberately cruel).

The Human Cost: Casualties and Atrocities

Military Casualties (Second Invasion)

Korean:

Military: ~20,000-30,000 killed
Civilians: ~300,000-500,000 killed (estimates vary widely)

Japanese:

Military: ~30,000-50,000 killed

Ming:

Military: ~15,000-25,000 killed (higher than First Invasion)

Total Second Invasion Deaths: ~365,000-605,000 (estimates)

Atrocities: The Ear and Nose Mounds

Hideyoshi’s Orders:

Unlike the First Invasion, Hideyoshi explicitly ordered soldiers to take ears and noses as proof of kills (for reward payments).

The Practice:

Japanese soldiers cut off ears and noses of killed enemies (soldiers and civilians)
Preserved them in salt
Sent barrels to Japan
Received payment based on count

Mimizuka (Ear Mound):

In Kyoto, Japan, there stands a monument called Mimizuka (耳塚, “Ear Mound”)—also called Hanazuka (鼻塚, “Nose Mound”).

Description:

Large burial mound containing the ears and noses of tens of thousands of Korean victims
Built in 1597 as a “trophy” of the war
Still stands today in Kyoto (near Toyokuni Shrine)

Estimates of victims: 38,000-100,000+ (sources vary widely; exact number unknown)

Modern Status:

Korean government has requested repatriation of remains
Controversial historical site
Symbol of war’s brutality

Civilian Suffering

Systematic Destruction:

Villages burned
Crops destroyed (causing famine)
Civilians massacred or enslaved
Infrastructure demolished

Example: Second Siege of Jinju (1593):

After finally capturing Jinju fortress (during the First Invasion’s end), Japanese forces massacred the entire population—soldiers and civilians alike.

Estimated deaths: 60,000-70,000 (entire fortress population)

Consequences of the Second Invasion

Korea

Immediate: ✗ Hundreds of thousands dead
✗ Southern Korea devastated
✗ Famine widespread
✗ Economy collapsed

Long-term: ✓ Admiral Yi Sun-sin became national hero
✓ Military reforms implemented
✓ Never again caught unprepared

Japan

Immediate: ✗ ~100,000+ troops lost (both invasions combined)
✗ Enormous financial cost
✗ Political instability (Toyotomi power collapsed)

Long-term:

Tokugawa Shogunate seized power (1603)
Isolationist policy for 250+ years
No foreign expansion until 19th century

Ming China

Immediate: ✗ ~50,000-60,000 troops lost (both invasions combined)
✗ ~26 million taels spent
✗ Treasury depleted

Long-term:

Financial crisis never recovered
Border defenses weakened (enabled Manchu rise)
Contributed to Ming collapse in 1644 (46 years later)

Lessons from the Second Invasion

1. Revenge Is Not Strategy

Hideyoshi’s Second Invasion was driven by fury and pride—not rational strategic objectives.

Result: Achieved nothing, wasted resources, ended in complete failure.

Modern Lesson: Wars require clear, achievable goals—not just emotional motivation.

2. Leadership Determines Outcomes

Won Gyun (incompetent) destroyed the fleet in one day.
Admiral Yi (genius) rebuilt it and won history’s most impossible battle.

Same navy, different leaders, opposite results.

Modern Lesson: Leadership quality matters more than numerical strength.

3. Geography Can Beat Numbers

Yi’s 13 ships defeated 133+ by using terrain (narrow strait, tidal currents) to negate Japanese advantages.

Modern Lesson: Asymmetric warfare—exploiting geography, intelligence, and tactics—can overcome overwhelming odds.

4. Fortress Defense Favors Defenders

Despite 4-to-1 or 5-to-1 numerical superiority, Ming-Korean forces failed to capture Japanese fortresses at Ulsan and Sacheon.

Modern Lesson: Well-designed fortifications defended by determined troops are extremely costly to assault.

5. Wars of Attrition Drain Everyone

By 1598, all three nations were exhausted:

Japan couldn’t sustain the offensive
Korea was devastated
Ming was bankrupt

No one “won”—everyone lost.

Modern Lesson: Prolonged wars of attrition destroy victor and vanquished alike.

Common Myths and Misconceptions

Myth 1: The Second Invasion Was the Same as the First

Reality:
Strategically different:

First Invasion: Rapid conquest attempt
Second Invasion: Fortress-based attrition warfare

Different outcomes:

First Invasion: Territorial gains, then stalemate
Second Invasion: Limited territorial control, eventual withdrawal

Myth 2: Japan Withdrew Because They Were Defeated in Battle

Partial Truth:
Japan couldn’t win—but the immediate cause of withdrawal was Hideyoshi’s death.

Without Hideyoshi’s death:

Japan might have held fortresses longer
Stalemate could have continued
Eventual withdrawal likely (but timing uncertain)

Hideyoshi’s death ended political will to continue.

Myth 3: Admiral Yi’s Death Was Tragic But Didn’t Matter

Reality:
Yi’s death was tragic—but his legacy ensured continued Korean naval strength.

His officers and trained crews:

Continued his tactics
Maintained naval dominance
Prevented Japanese recovery at sea

Yi’s death didn’t change the war’s outcome—but his life did.

Myth 4: The Ear Mound Contains 100,000+ Victims

Reality:
Unknown. Estimates range from 38,000 to 200,000.

Truth:

Tens of thousands of ears/noses were sent to Japan (documented)
Exact count unknown (barrels not individually tallied)
Includes combatants and civilians

Regardless of exact number, it represents massive atrocity.

Myth 5: The Second Invasion Was Less Important Than the First

Reality:
More brutal, more costly, more consequential:

Higher civilian casualties
Ming spent more money
Demonstrated Japan’s inability to win
Ended with Hideyoshi’s death → political transformation in Japan

The Second Invasion was the war’s climax—not an afterthought.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q1: Why did Hideyoshi order a second invasion if the first failed?

Answer:
Pride and rage.

Hideyoshi believed the “negotiations” had succeeded—that China would recognize him as equal. When the 1596 investiture revealed China viewed him as a subordinate, Hideyoshi’s ego couldn’t tolerate it.

The Second Invasion was revenge, not strategy.

Q2: How did Admiral Yi win at Myeongnyang with only 13 ships?

Answer:
Three factors:

Geography — Narrow Myeongnyang Strait prevented Japanese from using numerical superiority
Tidal currents — Yi timed engagement to use fierce currents against Japanese fleet
Discipline — Yi’s crews maintained formation and concentrated fire; Japanese panicked in the confined space

Yi didn’t “beat” 133 ships—he used terrain to negate their advantage.

Modern equivalent: Defending a mountain pass where only a few attackers can engage at once.

Q3: Could Japan have won if Hideyoshi lived longer?

Answer:
Unlikely.

Even if Hideyoshi lived:

Yi Sun-sin controlled the seas (Japanese couldn’t resupply)
Ming China committed to defending Korea
Japanese fortresses were strong—but couldn’t advance
Financial costs unsustainable

Hideyoshi’s death ended the war—but Japan couldn’t have won regardless.

Q4: What happened to the Korean sailors who survived Chilcheonryang?

Answer:
Most survivors rejoined Yi Sun-sin’s fleet after his reinstatement.

Yi:

Did not punish survivors (blamed Won Gyun’s leadership)
Retrained and integrated them into his reformed fleet
Many fought at Myeongnyang and Noryang

Yi’s compassion and leadership restored their morale.

Q5: Why didn’t Japan just bypass Yi’s fleet and land elsewhere?

Answer:
They tried—and Yi’s intelligence network caught them.

Yi’s scouts and spies monitored the entire southern coast. Whenever Japanese attempted:

Alternate landing sites → Yi moved to intercept
Resupply convoys → Yi ambushed them
End-runs around his positions → Yi predicted and blocked

Yi’s genius wasn’t just tactics—it was intelligence and positioning.

Q6: How is the Second Invasion remembered in Japan today?

Answer:
Mixed and often overlooked.

Popular Memory:

Less prominent than the First Invasion
Often seen as Hideyoshi’s “tragic mistake”
Some romanticize samurai bravery (fortress defenses)

Academic Perspective:

Recognized as strategic failure
Acknowledged brutality (Ear Mound controversial)
Seen as contributing to Toyotomi clan’s collapse

Overall: The war is not a source of pride in modern Japan—more a historical lesson about the costs of overreach.

Conclusion: Japan’s Futile Final Campaign

The Second Japanese Invasion (1597-1598) was:

More brutal than the first
More costly for all sides
Strategically meaningless

What Japan Gained: ✗ No territory
✗ No concessions from China or Korea
✗ No path to conquering China
✗ No prestige

What Japan Lost: ✗ 30,000-50,000 more soldiers dead
✗ Enormous financial resources
✗ Toyotomi political stability
✗ Hideyoshi’s legacy

The Second Invasion was revenge disguised as strategy—and it failed completely.

Admiral Yi Sun-sin’s return and victory at Myeongnyang symbolized the invasion’s futility: even after Korea’s fleet was destroyed, one man with 13 ships could hold the line.

When Hideyoshi died in September 1598, Japan had been fighting for six years, spent countless resources, lost ~100,000+ troops (both invasions), and gained absolutely nothing.

The war ended exactly where it began—with Japan on one side of the Korea Strait and Korea intact on the other.

The only difference: Korea was devastated, China was bankrupt, and Japan would turn inward for 250 years.

As Admiral Yi Sun-sin proved at Myeongnyang:

“It matters not how many ships the enemy has—what matters is the man who commands the ships that remain.”

Yi commanded 13 ships. He needed no more.

Next Steps: Explore the Aftermath

Understand the Complete War:

Heroes and Villains:

Key Battles:

The Battle of Hansando: Admiral Yi’s Naval Mastery
The Battle of Myeongnyang: 13 Ships vs. 133 (coming soon)

What Happened After:

The Imjin War Aftermath: Rebuilding a Shattered Korea (coming soon)
Ming China’s Intervention in the Imjin War

Admiral Yi Sun-sin: Biography of Korea’s Greatest Naval Commander
From disgrace to glory—Yi was tortured and demoted, then returned to achieve the impossible at Myeongnyang.
Read More →
The Battle of Myeongnyang: 13 Ships vs. 133
October 26, 1597: History’s most impossible naval victory. How did Yi do it?
Read More → (coming soon)
The First Japanese Invasion of Korea (1592-1593)
Japan conquered Korea in 20 days—then couldn’t hold it. Compare the two invasions.
Read More →
The Imjin War Aftermath: How Three Nations Rebuilt
The war ended—but Korea lay in ruins, China was bankrupt, and Japan turned inward for 250 years.
Read More → (coming soon)

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Explore more articles in Second Japanese Invasion (1597-1598) →

Sources

Yi Sun-sin, Admiral. Nanjung Ilgi: War Diary of Admiral Yi Sun-sin. Translated by Ha Tae-hung. Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1977. (Primary Source)
Joseon Wangjo Sillok (朝鮮王朝實錄) — Annals of the Joseon Dynasty, Seonjo Sillok (1567-1608). (Primary Source)
Hawley, Samuel. The Imjin War: Japan’s Sixteenth-Century Invasion of Korea and Attempt to Conquer China. Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, 2005.
Turnbull, Stephen. Samurai Invasion: Japan’s Korean War 1592-1598. London: Cassell, 2002.
Swope, Kenneth M. A Dragon’s Head and a Serpent’s Tail: Ming China and the First Great East Asian War, 1592-1598. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009.
Park, Yune-hee. Admiral Yi Sun-sin and His Turtleboat Armada. Seoul: Shinsaeng Press, 1978.
Ledyard, Gari. “Admiral Yi Sun-sin: Korea’s Nelson.” Korea Journal 14, no. 4 (1974): 4-12.
Kang, Etsuko Hae-jin. Diplomacy and Ideology in Japanese-Korean Relations: From the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997.
Lee, Ki-baik. A New History of Korea. Translated by Edward W. Wagner. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984.
Kim, Kichung. An Introduction to Classical Korean Literature: From Hyangga to Pansori. London: Routledge, 1996.

Last Updated: January 16, 2026

The Second Japanese Invasion (1597-1598): Japan’s Final Campaign